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Boosting Innovation and Productivity Growth in Europe:  
The hope and the realities of the EU’s ‘Lisbon agenda’ 
 
 
• The United States has significantly higher productivity than the European average. US GDP 
per hour is over 15% higher than Europe’s; and US GDP per capita is over 30% higher.  
 
• From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1990s, Europe was catching up with US 
levels of productivity. But since then, US productivity growth has been faster than in Europe. 
 
• In 2000, the European Union (EU) launched the ‘Lisbon agenda’. This had the aim of making 
Europe ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs, greater social cohesion and 
respect for the environment’. 
 
• Stimulating innovation was seen as a major route to reaching this goal. In particular, the EU 
set the ‘Barcelona target’ of increasing research and development (R&D) to 3% of GDP by 
2010. 
 
• The Lisbon agenda has not realised its objectives. A major reason for this is the failure of EU 
members to liberalise their product and labour markets. 
 
• Although the numerical target for R&D makes little economic sense, the emphasis on 
innovation as a route to growth is sensible.  
 
• The cost of patenting in Europe is about five times the cost of patenting in the United States. 
The suggested introduction of a ‘Community patent’ would lower this cost and make it easier 
for European firms to patent their innovations. 
 
• The ‘brain drain’ from the EU to the United States – because of better research opportunities 
and higher wages – is still a significant phenomenon. The Lisbon agenda’s aim of reversing 
this trend has not materialised.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For further information 
Contact Chiara Criscuolo: c.criscuolo@lse.ac.uk 0207 955 6973 
or Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (romesh@compuserve.com) 
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1. Introduction 
  
Output per person is a third higher in the United States than in Europe (see Figure 1). About half of 
this advantage is because more Americans are in work than Europeans, and the Europeans who do 
have jobs work fewer hours per year. But even taking these into account, productivity as measured by 
GDP per hour is still 17% higher in the United States. 
 
There is some variation in productivity across European countries. For example, French output per 
hour is actually higher than US productivity. But this may be a reflection of high wages causing a 
substitution of capital for less skilled labour. When this phenomenon is taken into account, even 
French ‘residual’ productivity is below that of the United States. 
 
Until relatively recently, Europeans could take heart from the fact that although they were less 
productive, they had been narrowing the gap since 1945 and converging with the United States. But 
this is no longer the case: since 1995, the United States has seen an acceleration in productivity 
growth that has not been matched in Europe (see Figure 2). European output per hour growth has been 
on average about 1 percentage point lower than in the United States since 1995.  
 
Figure 1: Economic performance in Europe and Japan relative to the United States (GDP per person and 
per hour worked) 
Percentage point differences with respect to the United States 
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10
United Kingdom
Japan
France 
Germany
EU19
Percentage gap with respect to US GDP per capita Percentage gap with respect to US GDP per hour worked  
Note: Figures refer to 2004 using official OECD PPPs for 2004. EU19 refers to EU members that are also 
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Source: OECD (http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/922005071G067.xls). 
 
Figure 2: Labour productivity growth in Europe and in the United States (growth of GDP per hour 
worked) 
Annual growth rates of real GDP/hour
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004
Years
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 G
ro
w
th
US
EU-15
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre
  
 
 3
How can the European Union (EU) improve its position relative to the United States? This policy 
analysis looks at the main driver of productivity growth: innovation.  
 
In 2000, EU leaders committed to the objective of making Europe ‘the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and 
better jobs, greater social cohesion and respect for the environment.’ They drew up the ‘Lisbon 
agenda’ to achieve this goal by 2010. The central strategy was based on policies to encourage 
investment in knowledge:  
 
• making innovation a top policy priority – the so-called ‘Barcelona target’ for research and 
development (R&D) to increase to 3% of GDP; 
• making Europe more attractive to talented researchers and removing obstacles to the mobility 
of European scientists; 
• and improving the business climate through measures to reduce the administrative burden on 
business, improving the availability of risk capital and facilitating the rapid start-up of new 
enterprises. These measures include creating an efficient and integrated financial services 
sector; building network industries in telecoms, utilities and transport; continuing the 
liberalisation process; and completing the single market. 
 
Six years on, progress has been poor. The reality is that Europe will not achieve the objectives for 
2010, if at all. The creation of a single EU financial services sector and more generally of a single 
market for services has failed to materialise.  
 
We start by benchmarking the EU innovation performance against that of its main competitors. 
 
 
2. Europe’s innovation performance  
 
Figure 3: Patents per million population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2005 
  
Figure 3 shows patents per million population as a measure of innovation output.1 These data reveal that the EU 
as a whole lags behind Japan and the United States. Between 1991 and 2001, Finland and Sweden 
overtook Japan and the United States, but the UK is still lagging behind most of its competitors. 
 
                                                     
1 The figures reported refer to ‘triadic patent families’, defined as patents taken at the European Patent Office, 
the Japanese Patent Office and the US Patent and Trademark office to protect the same invention. This patent-
based indicator has higher international comparability, comprises mainly patents of high value and nets out 
home advantage bias. 
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Of course, Figure 3 might be giving a biased picture of the innovation activity in a country. While 
patenting is an indicator of the output of innovation, not all innovations are patented and the 
importance of patents differs across industries so that the patenting figures might be biased by 
industry distributions within countries.  
 
Figure 4 looks at R&D and shows that the picture does not change dramatically: the EU is lagging 
behind Japan and the United States, with a ratio of R&D to GDP that has never gone past 2% let alone 
got anywhere close to the 3% target. The data also indicate that China is rapidly catching up with the 
rest of the world and in particular with the EU. 
 
The picture does not improve when we consider a broader measure of investment in knowledge to 
include investment in software and higher education as well as R&D expenditure. 
 
Figure 4: R&D expenditure 
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Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2005 
 
This evidence suggests that in terms of investment in R&D, Europe is still lagging behind the United 
States while China is quickly catching up, and that the Lisbon agenda seems to have made little 
difference for Europe’s innovation performance. 
 
3. Market failure and the rationale for innovation policies 
 
Nobody seems to be taking political ownership of the reforms needed to achieve the targets and so in 
2005, the governance model underlying the Lisbon agenda was changed (following only partly the 
guidelines of the Kok Report, 2004) to let each EU member follow its own ‘national reform 
programme’.  
 
Before discussing the possible policy measures that could be taken by the EU to improve Europe’s 
innovation performance, we need to look at the rationale for any innovation policy. We consider this 
under five categories: 
 
• financial market reform and innovation; 
• intellectual property rights; 
• foreign direct investment and knowledge spillovers; 
• the role of a strong science base; 
• and product market reform 
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Financial market reform and innovation 
 
There are two kinds of market failure that underlie a lack of investment in innovation.2 
 
The first relates to the fact that the returns to investment in knowledge and innovation cannot be fully 
appropriated by innovating firms as knowledge is a public good that can ‘spill over’ to others.3 This 
leads firms to ‘under-invest’ in innovation and a general level of investment below what would be the 
socially optimal level. To solve this problem, policy-makers can adopt various measures, such as a 
system of intellectual property rights, subsidies and R&D tax credits. 
 
The second market failure arises when firms undertaking investment in innovation need to find 
external funding sources. Innovation is a highly uncertain activity with big differences in the 
information available to inventors compared to investors. Therefore, external capital will only be 
available at a large cost and financial markets are unlikely to supply the correct amount of liquidity 
for R&D especially for small and start-up firms in R&D-intensive and high technology sectors. More 
generally, the presence of an efficient financial services sector might facilitate the growth of better 
firms after their start-up phase.  
 
Intellectual property rights 
 
Beside the market failures related to the public good nature of knowledge, further market failures 
arise from the fact that the costs of producing innovation are usually ‘fixed’ and ‘sunk’. This implies 
that firms will be willing to innovate as long as the potential market for their innovations is 
sufficiently large to cover their fixed costs; and second, when reproduction costs are a minimal 
fraction of the original sunk costs (sometimes zero), prices could fall significantly, again making it 
hard to recover the fixed innovation costs.  
 
Property rights that last for a limited period of time, such as those guaranteed by patents, give an 
innovating firm a temporary monopoly in the use of the knowledge it has created and make it possible 
to control the terms on which others can subsequently use the knowledge. This will allow innovating 
firms to recoup the costs of the investment the firm made. 
 
If the costs of protecting a new innovation (for example, if the administrative costs of patenting are 
very high), the transactions costs of developing an innovation will also be inflated. This is likely to 
make it more costly for firms to innovate and will therefore inhibit the rate of development of new 
ideas. 
 
Foreign direct investment and knowledge spillovers 
 
Knowledge as a public good with potential spillovers is the rationale behind intellectual property 
protection and subsidies for investments in innovations that will potentially lead to high spillovers. 
University research that creates basic knowledge is a leading example of this. But research shows that 
spillovers are also generated from private firms’ R&D4 and that firms can therefore benefit from the 
presence of more innovative and more productive firms.  
 
But which firms are more innovative and more productive? There is now widespread evidence that 
multinationals are both more innovative and more productive. This is the rationale for policies to 
                                                     
2 See Hall (2005) for a thorough discussion of these issues. 
3 A ‘public good’ is one that is ‘non-rival’ and ‘non-excludable’. Non-rival (in use) means that a good can be 
consumed without limiting the consumption of the same good by others. Non-excludability implies that the 
owner cannot (easily) prevent others from ‘free-riding’ or consuming the good without paying for it. 
4 For example, Bloom et al (2005). 
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attract foreign multinationals, which are more productive and more innovative than the average 
domestic firm.5 
 
But policies aimed at attracting foreign firms might not be the best strategy to reach the desired 
outcome for at least two reasons. 
 
First, empirical evidence shows that relative to domestic firms, multinationals are better at protecting 
their innovations and at preventing knowledge from spilling over their boundaries, through, for 
example, human resource strategies aimed at minimising worker turnover (Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2002). This suggests that domestic firms with access to international technology could be valid 
alternatives for the diffusion of know-how to the local economy. 
 
Second, domestic firms will be able to benefit fully from knowledge spillovers from foreign 
multinationals only if they have built sufficient ‘absorptive capacity’. If local firms lack this 
absorptive capacity, the potential benefits from the presence of foreign firms might be minimal. 
 
The role of a strong science base 
 
The spillovers argument is less plausible in a globalised world. In principle, Europe could ‘free ride’ 
on the innovations created by the United States and other leading countries. But knowledge is still 
‘local’ and does not flow immediately across national boundaries. Furthermore, countries that do 
more R&D and have a strong science base can more easily understand and adopt leading edge 
innovations. This ‘absorptive capacity’ is a reason for promoting a strong science base even in the 
presence of international knowledge spillovers. 
 
Product market reform 
 
Econometric evidence shows that an increase in competitive pressure leads firms to innovate more.6 
Thus, a market free from barriers to entry and other regulations where ex ante competition is high is 
likely to be associated with an increased rate of innovation. 
 
At the same time, one of the factors likely to affect a firm’s investment behaviour is the potential 
profitability of an innovation: one solution is to give innovators some ex post monopoly power on 
their innovations (for example, through patents). 
 
A second possibility is the existence of a sizeable market where firms can sell their new products and 
exploit larger returns to scale will guarantee firms larger expected profits from their innovation 
activity7 and give them a larger probability of recouping the sunk costs of their investment. This will 
lead to a higher rate of innovation. 
 
 
4. EU innovation policies 
 
Many aspects of innovation policies – such as tax incentives – fall within the remit of individual EU 
members. Here, while it has no direct influence, the EU could have a role in spreading information 
about best practices based on careful evaluation. In other areas, the EU has a direct influence through 
its own control of the budget and policies. But the already relatively small EU budget has not been 
modified nor increased to help in achieving the Lisbon goals. 
 
In this section, we discuss for each of the market failures described above the role that the EU could 
play in determining the policy outcomes. 
 
 
                                                     
5 See, for example, Criscuolo and Martin, 2005, and Criscuolo et al, 2005). 
6 For example, Blundell et al (1999) and Aghion et al (2005). 
7 For a recent study of the role of market size for innovation, see Acemoglu and Linn (2004). 
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Financial market reforms and innovation  
 
The EU has an important role in the financing of R&D through the development of a EU-wide 
financial services sector with a more liberalised banking system and venture capital market. As Figure 
5 shows, the EU is lagging far behind the United States in the size of its venture capital market, both 
for early stages and expansion financing.8 
 
Venture capital investment is a major source of funding for new technology-based firms and is a key 
factor in promoting the development of radical innovations, as it can provide the necessary funding 
for the risky and uncertain innovation process especially for younger firms. This might be important 
for catching up with the United States, since efficient European firms find it much harder to grow 
quickly than their US counterparts.  
 
Figure 5: Investment in venture capital as a percentage of GDP 2000-2003 
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Source: OECD, STI scoreboard 2005 
 
Policy-makers have a range of activities that can stimulate the venture capital and private equity 
markets: from providing loans, guarantees and subsidies for private funds to tax relief programmes 
and regulatory activities such as creating viable investment vehicles. 
 
The role of the EU can be twofold. First, it can guarantee and oversee the removal of legal barriers 
standing in the way of private investment through the development of a EU-wide financial services 
sector with a more liberalised banking system and venture capital market. 
                                                     
8 Early stages venture capital includes seed capital, which is provided to research, assess and develop an initial 
concept; and start-up financing, which is provided for product development and initial marketing. Expansion 
venture capital provides funding for the growth and expansion of a company to finance increased production 
capacity, market or product development and/or to provide additional working capital. 
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Second, it can help to create a network among EU member to encourage venture capital funds to 
invest in innovative small businesses. 
As of now, the EU seems to have been less successful in guaranteeing the provision of a single EU 
financial market than in spreading information about good practice. Indeed, in 1998, the European 
Commission adopted ‘action plans’ aiming to create a pan-European venture capital market. 
For example, the ‘risk capital action plan’ includes initiatives such as regulatory changes, 
entrepreneurship promotion, development of a business angel network; and the ‘seed capital 
programme’ consists of refunding up to 50% of a private venture capital fund's operating costs. The 
EU also provides support for the European Venture Capital Association and the promotion of venture 
capital and private equity investing and spreading knowledge of the principles of such activities 
among European entrepreneurs and investors.  
 
Creating an efficient intellectual property system 
 
Because of the public nature of knowledge, innovators need some degree of intellectual property 
protection to reap the benefits of commercialising their inventions. According to a recent study 
(European Patent Office, 2005), the cost of registering patents across the EU varies between €37,500 
and €57,000 in the EU, which is as much as five times the cost of patenting in the United States.  
Therefore, proposals to institute a single ‘Community patent’, which will be less costly and less 
bureaucratic should be welcomed,9 as according to figures attributed to EU officials, the Community 
patent would reduce that cost by around 60% to €22-23,000 (see comment by Grazyna Piesiewicz in 
Meller, 2006), mainly by reducing the registration and translation costs of patenting. 
 
Improving the science base 
 
What of the Lisbon agenda’s strategy for competing for the best brains in the world? One of the 
biggest threats to Europe’s leadership as a knowledge-based economy is the anticipated shortage of 
highly qualified R&D staff.10 
 
Although the mobility of EU researchers across EU members has improved, the movement of non-EU 
nationals across EU members is still an issue. Indeed, the United States seems still to be the preferred 
destination for migrant scientists. The trend is for an increase in economic migration to the EU, but 
there are still problems of brain drain from the EU in favour of the United States (see Hanson, 2003) 
because of better access to leading technologies, work quality and higher wages. 
 
South East Asian countries, such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and more recently China, have 
successfully managed to increase return migration of their scientists back from the United States. This 
allows the transfer of knowledge and research practices back to the home country. 
 
The EU could follow a similar strategy to spur both immigration from non-EU scientist and return 
migration of EU scientists by developing centres of excellence for scientific research; improving the 
amount and use of research funding in the EU and foster the creation of networks between centres of 
excellence and between centres of excellence and industry. The Sapir (2003) report called for the 
creation of an independent European agency for science and research modelled on the US National 
Science Foundation to guarantee more transparency and competition in assigning research funding.  
                                                     
9 A Community patent would give inventors the possibility of applying for a single patent legally valid 
throughout the EU. This would mean a substantial reduction in patenting costs (for example, translation and 
filing costs); a single procedure to protect inventions throughout the EU territory and the establishment of a 
single centralised system of litigation. But the creation of a Community patent system is still in a deadlock 13 
years after it was first proposed to EU decision-makers (see Buck, 2006 for details). 
10 A much quoted figure is that ‘for the EU to meet the goal set at the 2002 Barcelona summit of increasing 
R&D spending as a share of GDP to 3% by 2010, the EU will have to add 700,000 new researchers to the 
workforce.’ (Gago Report, 2004). 
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Product market reform and competition 
 
An EU policy of lowering product market regulation and of completion of the single market might 
spur firms’ investment in innovation through increasing competition and market size. As Figure 6 
shows, the level of regulatory burden on firms in the EU decreased between 1998 and 2003, but it is 
still higher than that faced by firms in the United States. 
 
Having an European single market might also guarantee the existence of a sizeable market where 
firms can sell their new products and exploit larger returns to scale. 
 
The EU could also improve product market competition and increase market size by implementing the 
Services Directive. 
 
Figure 6: Cross country comparison of product market regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The reality does not really reflect the hopes of the Lisbon agenda’s very ambitious programme. 
Certain goals, such as the R&D target of 3%, will not be achieved by 2010 and the gap between 
leading (Nordic) and laggard (southern European) countries in innovation performance seems to have 
increased during the last five years. 
 
The EU should carry on pushing forward policies that lower product and labour market regulation as 
these will have positive effects on innovation through multiple channels. The creation of a liberalised 
financial sector, a single European market and a Community patent will also contribute to making 
Europe more innovative. 
 
Europe needs to increase the amount and quality of the research funding it sponsors, possibly by 
modifying the priorities of its current EU budget to reflect the Lisbon vision and spurring competition 
and best practice among research institutions in EU members. 
 
In general, it seems that the goals of the Lisbon agenda have been lacking a coherent strategy. The 
open coordination method and best practices have not been enough of a driving force. There needs to 
be more rigorous and efficient delivery and strict evaluation of what countries have achieved. 
 
For further information 
Contact Chiara Criscuolo: c.criscuolo@lse.ac.uk 0207 955 6973 or Romesh Vaitilingam on 
07768-661095 (romesh@compuserve.com) 
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